ER 61-4618/a

ैं 14 June 1961

Maj. General C. A. Willoughby

Dear General Willoughby:

X1

Your letter of 2 June 1961 was most interesting. It was thoughtful of you to let me know your opinion on several matters discussed and also to give me the program for the four articles by you that will appear in the Weekly Crusader.

Every good wish to you and the patriotic work you are doing.

Sincerely,

SIGNAL.

Allen W. Dulles Director

O/DCI/SJGrogan 8Jun61 Rewritten O/DCI/JSE/blp 14Jun61 Distribution:

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Approved For Release 2003/01/29: CIA-RDB80B01676R0026000800601taTy News Digest".

An impartial analysis of political, economic and military events



An impartial analysis of political, economic and military events in the critical areas of the world, derived from sources not normally available. Editor: Major General Charles A. Willoughby, Ret. Mültary Attaché: U. S. Embassies in Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador (1921-1929). MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence: Corregidor, Australia, New Guinea, the Philippines (1941-1945). Occupation of Japan (1945-1951). Sino-Korean War (1950-1951). Awards and Decorations: United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Philippines, Venezuela and Ecuador. Writer. Lecturer. Publisher. Books: America in World War I (1929). Maneuver in War (1939). Documentation Sorge Espionage Case (1947), Bailen: The Spanish Bridgehead (1948). Intelligence in War (1949). Aid and Comfort to the Enemy (1951). The Shanghai Conspiracy (1952). MacArthur: 1941-1951 (1954) The Karl May Series Vol. I: In the Desert (1955) Contributor: The Cosmopolitan. Readers Digest. Freeman. National Review + Houston Chronicle, Editor: American Mercury. Christian Crusade. Weekly Crusader. Washington Representative of Christian Crusade and Weekly Crusader. Tulsa, Oklahoma.

Ar Allen W Dulles

June 2/61

61-4618

The Director: Cent Intell agency
Washington 25 D.

I was pleased to have your reaction to my first piece on the Central Intell Agency. I could have run it earlier, in timing with the Cuban embroglio but held it pending your approval, as per our genetleman's agreement. It will appear in Issue of the Weekly Crusader In the meantime, I developed a study on the

Cuban business, with my usual approach: a nuance of interpretation, in the framewrok of "intelligence practices". One reason I haid emphasis on the sequence of Korean reports (MacArthur era) is the absolute evidence that intelligence is the whipping-boy of operations, the scape-goat of faulty commadadecisions. If you reflect on the adverse publicity accruing to your agency, you will accept that this "indirect approach", in the enclosure "The Fack's in full Cry". No 30 May 19/61 and 31 May 26/61 is bound to be helpful to the C.I.A. position, now emotionally endangered?

The next move (on my part) was the basic "Intellarticle, which you have read. It follows immediately upon the heels of the other. My idea of timing and nuance.....

Colonel Crogan is wrong about "hungary". My pro-

ram is t e following :

1 The Pack's in Full Cry : Ceneral review, as enclosed

2 The Central Intelligence Agency: You have read

3 The Director of the C.I.A.: rersonalia, a mosaic, in preparation

4 Operations of the C.I.A. :Selected favourable items

That would complete the cycle. As to immediacy of sequences, my trouble is that there is always something more urgent coming up; I will have to cover the geopolitical implications of the "Summit" - whatever that is?

A propos of nothing, over one hundred (100) members of Congress receive and read the Weekly Crusader; the combined circulation of Dr Hargis publications aggregate over 100 000 conies, backed by radio-broadcasts etc.

It might be advisable to disseminate copies of this series, to a wider group ?You could not write this type of article (that would be charged to propaganda) but an impartial outsider ", like myself canespecially as I have not entirely approved of the C.I.A. charter or its structure. In this connection, you may recall our conversation in 1956 ? I think Mr Jackson flitted in and out of your office ? It was quite clear to me, based on my efforts to fit C.I.A. into the MacArthur command structure in Japan, that you will always be in collision, overt or covert, with the Services. The studied selection of a Deputy, from a single branch (Air) was injuducuous, then and now. Assuming you had three Deputies, then the military features of the Cugan pla ning would

plonning would have collided with the professional opinion of your three (3) service deputies, ground, air and navy and the weak features (lack of air cover) would have become insistent

At any rate, you would have had the protection of a

service opinion.

Another elment (and I pointed it out to you, or some of your people) if you dabble in military operations, it would be desirable that your training courses involve some basic instriction in the "art of war", in the immutable principles, in the cultural approac to military history that is an element of all staff colleges of all armies. I recommended that, too, the insertion of the lectures of "Manuever in War", which I conducted at Leavenworth and which was published both out there, as an official text, and by Stackpole , Harrisburg commerically. Sucha course, a seminar at least would give you the authority to state that "indoctrination is one the level of strategic thought". It would help your people, too, associated with higher Headquarters. —

Well - this is not intented to make recommendations where they are not wanted. I expect to go my own way, as usual, with or without help, with an effort toward Congressional indoctrination as I watch, with sagness, Oswald Spengler's "Untergang des Abendlendes" -

With kind personal regards

Enclsoures :

P. S. And who the hell selected Jose Miro Cardona, Manuel Ray, Antonio A de Varona, Hevia, Carillo and Carbo On what conceivable ground could ex-henchmen of Castro become the "hope of liberation"?

This is the parallel of the posture vis-vis Czecho-Slovakia and the acceptance of Zenkl and his crowd when it was amply clear that they were part and parcel of the barbarian expulsion of the Sudtten group.

traternally

Collaborators with Communist regimes will be tainted forever. This flirtation with the "left" is characteristic of State and the Rubottom-Wieland Monte negro -Duran coteries.

Cabell has not covered himself with any glory when he pronounced that negative classic "...Castro re - presnets leadership of a nationalistic, bourgeois-democratic revolution which preceded a Communsit rise in power.."

Just what is "bourgeois-democratic revolution"? Is Bolshevism the prototype? "r the take-over in Czecho-Slovakia? Or the "peoles courts" in Batavia and Soerabaja? or the blood-bath of the rejicides of Baghdad? There is one common element: The sickness of the West since Robespierre and Bakunin, a perennial Jacobinism that grows on terror and assassination

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

An impartial analysis of political, economic and military events in the critical areas of the world, derived from confidential sources, with emphasis on facts that have not been made public. Editor: Major General C. A. Willoughby, U.S.A. Ret. Writer. Publisher. Lecturer. Mil. Attache Am. Embassies: Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador 1921-1929. MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence 1939-1951. Washington Representative Christian Crusade.



A LETTER TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY BY DR. EMILIO NUNEZ PORTUONDO

Editor's Note: Dr. Emilio Nunez Portuondo, a distinguished Cuban Diplomat and Jurist is better known to the American television audience through his spirited agitation in behalf of the Hungarian Freedom fighters, perishing in the agony of Budapest. He is a former President of the Security Council of the United Nations. An exile from Castro's Cuba, he is Editor of "Latin American Events," Washington, D.C. His views on prostrate Cuba are those of an expert on the Caribbean and his country.

HIS EXCELLENCY JOHN F. KENNEDY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

In 1958 at a dinner in my honor given by the Ambassador of France in Havana, I was greatly thrilled when you lifted your glass in a toast to me in which you expressed the gratitude of the American people for my long years of work in the United Nations in defense of the cause of the free world and my indefatigable labor devoted to strengthening ties between the United States and Cuba. Your words, Mr. President, so flattering to me, were in recognition of more than forty years of dedication to the fight against international Communism.

You may have had in mind the proposal which I made at the Eighth Inter-American Conference at Lima in 1938, and which was approved barring Nazi-type measures against the Jewish population of the American Republics. You may also have had in mind my reply to the Soviet Foreign Minister at the United Nations General Assembly held in San Francisco in 1955 to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the signing of the UN Charter. After the Soviet delegate endeavored to describe his government as the champion of peace, for the first time from that great stage I denounced the new Russian and Chinese colonialism, which in less than half a century had enslaved hundreds of millions of human beings. You may also have been thinking of my energetic protest against the bloody Soviet repression in Hungary, or of my defense of US and British troops in Lebanon and Jordan — the presence of which resulted in safeguarding these peoples from the Communist yoke, or of my activity during the Korean crisis when that country was invaded by North Korean Communists and Chinese, an invasion that resulted in Red China being denounced as an aggressor by a great majority of Member States of the United Nations. Or perhaps you were thinking of my expose of the report alleged to have been written by impartial scientists claiming that the United States had utilized bacteriological warfare in the Korean conflict — I showed that that report was not signed by impartial men of science, but rather by militant Communists.

CUBA, COMMUNIST SATELLITE

Now, Mr. President, I find myself in exile because my fatherland has fallen into the hands of the Soviet Union and Red China. As soon as Fidel Castro and his comrades took power, I resigned my position as Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations and began to devote myself to the difficult job (those were the days when the noble people of the United States were so easily deceived) of clarifying the true aims of Castro—that the Hemisphere would be the victim of a vast and well-planned conspiracy whose objective was to communize, first Cuba, and then all of Latin America. This was a conspiracy that also aimed at isolating the United States from its natural allies in the Americas.

INTERVIEWS WITH JOHN FOSTER DULLES

I feel that I have the moral authority, Mr. President, to write this open letter because I have never betrayed my government nor my country and because from the beginning of the July 26th Movement I warned in every proper way possible that the first large-scale Communist conspiracy had begun to take over the Western Hemisphere. I spoke often with the Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, with Roy Rubottom, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Latin American affairs, with Mr. William A. Wieland, Director of the Office of Mexican and Caribbean Affairs, with the assistant director, Mr. Snow, as well as with other U.S. Government officials. To all of them I presented proofs of the long-standing Communist mili-

The WEEKLY CRUSADER Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP80B01676R002600080001-7

tancy of Fidel Castro, who in 1948 took an active part in the tragic "Bogotazo," that bloody episode that spread desolation in Bogota and which had as its main objective the disruption of the Ninth Inter-American Conference. Colombian police seized evidence which conclusively proved that Fidel Castro, then a University of Havana student, had Communist affiliations. I also recounted the history of Castro's activities in Cuba, pointing out his consistent Communist militancy and that he had perpetrated several murders.

July 26, 1953, Fidel Castro, at the head of a group dominated by well-known Communists, attacked the Cuartel Moncada, in Santiago de Cuba, in an effort to capture it by surprise. All that was accomplished was wholesale killing. Castro was tried and sentenced to several years in prison, but he never served the full sentence - Congress granted him an amnesty. At the trial, Fidel Castro was authorized to defend himself. In his plea he repeated paragraphs from the defense speech which Adolph Hitler delivered when the German dictator was on trial for the Munich riots, and Castro concluded, as Hitler had, with the phrase, "History will absolve me." In his speech Castro revealed the program of the July 26th Movement, in which he left no doubt that he would carry out, if he triumphed, the program which he has put into effect during the past two years.

PREDICTIONS THAT CAME TRUE

In a letter dated March 27, 1958, I predicted to Mr. Dulles the occurrence of everything that has happened in Cuba during these last two years, a repetition of what happened in the countries conquered by the Soviet Union and Red China: mass executions (either without trial or from sentences passed by drumhead courts) murder of persons who were not militant in international Communism and who constituted our best human reserves, imprisonment of more than twenty thousand persons, confiscation of all national and foreign assets, without any compensation; religious persecution; collectivization of the land, after dispossessing the owners without compensation; creation of collective farms in which the farmer has become converted into a serf; militarization of the working class without recognition of the right to strike or to express opinions; abolition of freedom of the press and confiscation of all the newspapers and magazines; suppression of free enterprise; intense campaigning to sow the seeds of hatred among men, women and children of different races and classes; submission of the professionals to the Communist totalitarian system; suppression of the freedom of teaching by closing private schools and Marxist and anti-U.S. indoctrination of the public school students; organization of a judiciary completely subverted to the interests of the State; refusal to hold elections; dissolution of all political parties except the Communist Party which is the

only party authorized to carry out recruitment activities; prohibition of public meetings unless called by the Government to support its policies; complete negation of the right of free expression inasmuch as the press, radio and television belong to the government; total compulsory military service of all Cubans in the militia. The Communist regime of Castro counts on an armed strength which is greater in proportion to population than that of the Soviet Union and the United States combined.

I also gave timely warning that after the establishment of a Communist regime it would be exported to the rest of the Hemisphere by armed invasion and by subversion, converting the Americas into a genuine inferno. The invasions launched from Cuba against Panama, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Haiti, Guatemala and Dominican Republic, bear this out. I might add that there is not one single state in Latin America where subversion, directed from Havana in close alliance with national Communists and the Governments of Moscow and Peking, has not planted the seeds of hatred and death. The Governments of Peru and Uruguay have shown proof that the Cuban diplomatic missions are utilized to overthrow the democratic governments of the New World.

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. President, I do not pretend to fix responsibilities, although I am not without a certain right to do so inasmuch as my fellow countrymen, my family and I are victims of the mistakes made. It cannot be denied that treaties were violated when numerous expeditions of men, arms, munitions, explosives, and medicines left U.S. shores to assist the Cuban Communists. A large sector of the press, radio and television and outstanding public figures of United States rendered help. Public collections of money for Castro were held in U.S. cities.

The embargo placed by the State Department on arms destined for the defense of Cuba, purchased in accordance with terms of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, was another factor responsible for the victory of Fidel Castro.

As an example of the lack of discernment when dealing with the Cuban problem, on January 31, 1958, Mr. Roy Rubottom declared before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Senate, "There is no evidence of organized Communist elements in the Castro movement, nor does Mr. Castro find himself submissive to Communist influence."

The actions of U.S. State Department officials in favor of the Communist revolution have been evidenced by the declarations given under oath before the Senate sub-committee on Internal Security by the distinguished Ambassadors Arthur Gardner and Earl T. Smith who explained why they had decided to testify,

adding that the Castro revolution could not have had as one of its causes the economic situation because at the time Cuba was enjoying a period of great prosperity and its inhabitants ranked second among the American states in income per capita. The statements of these exdiplomats have been corroborated in speeches and declarations made by Senators and Representatives in the Congress, among them Democratic Senators Smathers, Dodd and Eastland and Republicans Bridges, Bush and Hickenlooper.

SUGGESTIONS AND CONCRETE PROPOSALS

It is not the purpose of this letter to enter into futile recriminations. Since it is now a recognized fact that a Communist regime exists in Cuba at the unconditional service of Moscow and Peking, I feel that my forty years of experience in combatting Communism and my awareness of the situation existing in my country entitle me to express the following points of view:

First: History has not recorded a single case of a Communist regime supported by the Soviet Union and Red China being overthrown without the support of outside forces. In the case of Hungary, the 100-day Communist government of Bela Kun was thrown out of power in 1919 by the military forces of Czechoslovakia and Rumania, then non-Communist. In the case of Guatemala, often offered as the example of self-salvation, the civil government had been infiltrated by Communism, but the armed forces of Guatemala were intact and not subject to Communist influence — these were the forces that saved the country from the red yoke.

The first thing that Fidel Castro did was to dissolve the professional armed forces, killing a great number of its officers and soldiers, and organize a new communist armed force and popular militia, equally militant.

Experience also shows that economic reprisals alone are not enough to overthrow a Communist regime. Note the futile blockade against the Soviet Union and Red China.

Second: To pretend that a country of six million inhabitants can liberate itself, by its own efforts, thus vanquishing the Soviet Union and Red China and their satellites, is not only unrealistic but constitutes a negation of the principles of democratic and Hemispheric solidarity, so often preached. We can never accept as valid the argument that the Cuban problem is solely the problem of the Cubans, first because the facts point to the contrary and because we Cubans are not the only ones responsible for what has befallen in our country.

Third: You should look askance, Mr. President, on the advice of Latin American governments to maintain the non-intervention policy at all cost, particularly when the government giving that advice has itself practiced intervention in the past. Such counsel is often offered because of sordid desires to grab a large part of the Cuban sugar quota and tourist trade.

(Continued in Next Issue)

COMMUNISM IN THE CARIBBEAN

The dismal failure of the recent Cuban invasion, actually only a small-scale probing action by approximately 12/1500 men, brought on the customary "soul searching" by the liberal (crypto-Communist) press, with a view to discredit the Government, the Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency. We intend to cover these features promptly and in full detail. For the moment, we suggest our readers go over their file of recent copies of the "WEEKLY CRUSADER" and note the articles on Communism in South America, in general, and the penetration of the Caribbean in particular. Every facet of this sorry business has already been covered. Extracts from current issues, viz:

ISSUE NO. 2. NOV. 4/60. PANAMA CANAL FLAG INCIDENT:

"... The expropriation pattern set by Nasser in the Suez Crisis may be applied to the Panama Canal. A sly comment by Castro points to the World Court as the means." He said "... No military action against Guantanamo. We expect to obtain its return thru international legal channels (i.e. the World Court, already stacked against the United States)..."

ISSUE NO. 3. NOV. 11/60. CUBAN BEATNIKS INVADE THE U.N.

"... Pro-United Nations fanatics proclaim a "world of laws." The grim realities in the U.N., however, contain every element of political crime, subversion and amoralities, viz:

Cynical pretense that Red dictators represent their people

Acceptance of Red stooges as U.N. delegates Acquiescence in Genocide (Hungary) Theft (confiscation) of private properties (Cuba)

Mass Murder and Regicide (Iraq) Despoliation of war-time Allies (Dutch in Indonesia)

Seating Rapists and Mutineers (Lumumba) Membership without social or moral standards

Castro and his Beatniks spend a thousand dollars a day in New York hotels. They could afford it: they robbed American investors of approximately 750 million dollars of tangible assets . . ."

ISSUE NO. 5. NOV. 25/60. THE KREMLIN AT YOUR DOORSTEPS.

"... Soviet Russia has succeeded in focusing American interests on remote Areas (Korea, Tibet, Laos). In the meantime, the Russian planners have quictly worked on Latin-America. In the Moscow Congress of Oct. 1952 a plan for "Operation Latin America" was announced: methodical development of "national fronts and heavy armaments for pro-Communist Governments.

ISSUE NO. 6. NOV. 25/60. THE KREMLIN AT YOUR DOORSTEPS.

". . . Batista was ousted with the blessing of New York City "liberals" (crypto-Communists). The Castro revolt was "hot-housed" by a group of normally responsible publications in New York City.

Without the terrific build-up which these non-Communists have given him, Castro and his Argentine henchman "Che" Guevara would still remain the obscure bandits of the Sierra—which they eventually turned out to be on a large scale.

- "... The New York "liberals" are in hot pursuit of Trujillo with an irresponsibility that is nothing short of suicidal in the light of what happened to American properties (in Cuba) in the hands of undisguised Kremlinist thieves and saboteurs.
- "... There is a considerable body of worried opinion in the Congress on the infiltration of Communism in the Caribbean. The Hon. Daniel J. Flood (D. Penn.) and the Hon. Craig Hosmer (R. Cal.) have made important efforts in the Congress (to correct State Department fumbling). They have filed formal "Resolutions" and will press for the ultimate cnactment of the application of the Monroe Doctrine (in the case of Cuba) ..."

This same issue also contains an important article by Dr. Charles Callan Tansil, Ph.D. Emeritus, American Diplomatic History, Georgetown University, on "Is Our Monroe Doctrine Out of Date?" It is a definite study on our rights and duties.

ISSUE NO. 8. DEC. 16/61. CONTINUITY OF THE PANAMA FLAG INCIDENT.

ISSUE NO. 12. JAN. 13/61.
NICARAGUA AND PANAMA.

ISSUE NO. 13. JAN. 20/61.
NICARAGUA AND PANAMA.

"Both articles, in serial continuity, are a discussion and historical survey of the Panama Canal and proposed alternate routes. The strategic importance of the Panama Canal is evidenced in an accompanying map. The "Caribbean Barrier" a chain of islands containing Cuba, has been the traditional shield against

enemy approaches to the Canal. The "barrier". is obviously endangered when hostile Communist elements have gained a foothold.

ISSUE NO. 15. FEB. 3/61. CUBA: TEACHING THE YOUNG TO HATE AMERICANS.

ISSUE NO. 19. MARCH 3/61. EPITAPH FOR THE PAN-AMERICAN LINION.

". . . The sub-titles are self explanatory: (1) Why do we lose in Latin-America? (2) Shift from the Pan-American Union to the O.A.S. (3) Obsessions of the State Department.

The decade 1950-60 has been an era of humiliating retreat for the United States in Latin America. Two parallel forces have contributed to this American eclipse—(1) International Communism—identified and recognized by most thinking Americans although its shifting disguises often fool us. (2) A demagogic Latin-American Socialism which takes many chameleon forms is not so well understood.

The fatal turn which our State Department has taken during this decade has been to accept scheming socialists as bona fide allies in place of the genuine conservatives and anti-Communists with whom we have traditionally worked.

In pursuit of this preposterous policy, we have steadily surrendered the rights which we possessed under the Monroe Doctrine and the historical bond of the previous "Pan American Union," one of the best regional understandings ever developed in this hemisphere — an all-American product that took years of diplomatic skill and patience to create.

The strong, conservative but virile tradition of the "Pan-American Union" is now buried in the morass of the United Nations phony legalities and has become "The Organization of the American States" (O.A.S).

The Russian delegate in the U.N. has already attempted to challenge the O.A.S. under Par 53 ". . . subject to revision by the Security Council." The occasion was the rejection by Castro of the criticism by the O.A.S., a forerunner of more intrigues to come. The ingenuous Alger Hiss — erstwhile darling of the State Department — has planted a subtle, corrosive device in the United Nations' charter.

In an effort to appease the Latin American Socialists, we have transferred to the O.A.S. the final decision in all major Latin-American issues — except the outpouring of our money . . . "

In order to remind our readers of the impact of a Russian controlled Cuba on the defense of the Panama Canal (or any alternate Canal route in the Isthmus) we have reproduced the map on page 6 of Issue No. 13, January 20/61. The accompanying legend is a brief but complete definition of the strategic factors inherent in the Caribbean.



An impartial analysis of political, economic and military events in the critical areas of the world, derived from confidential sources, with emphasis on facts that have not been made public. Editor: Majar General C. A. Willaughby, U.S.A. Ret. Writer. Publisher. Lecturer. Mil. Attache Am. Embassies: Venezuela, Calambia, Ecuadar 1921-1929. MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence 1939-1951. Washington Representative Christian Crusade.



CUBA: THE PACK'S IN FULL CRY-

ATTACKS ON PENTAGON AND INTELLIGENCE

KOREA (1951) AND CUBA (1961): THEY NEVER LEARN

On page four we have reproduced a brilliant "Chicago Tribune" cartoon, depicting the coordinated smear campaign and character assassination of MacArthur during the Sino-Korean conflict 1950-1951. His Eighth Army completely defeated the North-Korean Communists and after Inchon (June 1950) took over 100,000 Red prisoners.

Four months later, this same Army, with approximately 9 Divisions, was forced to fall back temporarily under the impact of fresh forces — the Chinese Red Army — initially with 33 Divisions to be increased rapidly to a maximum of 72 Divisions, in the spring of 1951. This overwhelming concentration was permitted to proceed leisurely, immune and unchallenged in the U.N. engineered "sanctuary" behind the Yalu. When the Red invasion of North-Korea began to roll across the Yalu, the hue-and-cry was raised immediately, charging MacArthur with faulty intelligence. This press smear was an unmitigated lie, as I established elsewhere (MacArthur: 1941-1951. McGraw Hill Co.), aided and abetted by a silent Pentagon, who gauged Truman's hostility to MacArthur accurately, and prudently abstained from defending a Commander who was on his way to a dismissal. The Pentagon crowd (of that period) took no chances on backing wrong horses or fighting lost causes.

Whenever the congenital idiocy of our foreign and military policy leads to an impasse or the liberal, i.e. cripto-Communist Press is looking for scalps, the target is either an unpopular commander (as MacArthur) or the intelligence Services. This happened in Korea (1951). It was to happen again in the abortive Franco-British-Israeli operations in the Suez Canal. It is happening right now, in blaming both the Generals (J.C.S.) and the Central Intelligence Agency (Allen Dulles) for the abortive Cuban "invasion."

AID AND COMFORT TO THE ENEMY

The Press pack is in full cry. The Monday morning quarterbacks are tracing the games on the blackboard. The Cocktail strategists, lifting a dry Martini in some Washington Bistro, have it all figured out . . .

I demolished these fakers with gusto in the Cosmopolitan, December 1951 issue "The Truth about Korea." It should be done again in the case of Cuba. I range myself flatly with the "accused" — but plead for a "dismissal of the charges." The whole performance is beneath contempt. The "pen prostitutes," who have been responsible initially for the "image of Castro" and the Argentine imposter, Che Guevara, are busy again "pinning something on somebody," unaware that they are once more furnishing "aid and comfort to the enemy." Do they secretly hope to ingratiate themselves with Khrushchev, hedging against odds that are not exactly improving? If you scratch them hard enough, you will probably find draft-dodgers and embusques who prefer cocktails to combat.

In the artificially contrived hysteria of the moment, the charges and counter-charges, the cry for blood of the ignorant mob — the unctuous post-mortems of the egoists, certain professional, military factors emerge that contained the germs of disaster from the very beginning, viz:

- 1. The strength of the invasion was 12/1500 men
- 2. Such weak forces cannot hold a beachhead
- 3. Beachheads are a preliminary for further reinforcements
- 4. No Air cover was provided for
- 5. A raid by 3 bombers was totally ineffective
- 6. A force of 1200 men and 3 bombers were doomed from the outset
- 7. Castro had armed 2/300,000 "militia" supported by Russian tanks.

- 8. The Invaders hired a Madison Ave. public relations firm
- They blew up a "Corporal's Guard" into a Normandy landing.

The Russians do this sort of thing much better as one can observe in round-the-clock airlifts for the "rebels" in Laos. They never send a boy to do a man's job. They make sure that flamboyant failures do not "tarnish" their murderous prestige. In crushing the Hungarian uprising, the Russians used at least nine (9) Divisions. With an eye to covering the Western flank, five (5) Divisions remained in Czechoslovakia, one (1) armored Division in Moravia, two (2) Infantry and two (2) Armored Divisions in Slovakia. Budapest was engulfed frontally with four (4) Divisions.

STATE DEPARTMENT REPORTS ON CASTRO'S ARMY

The overwhelming military superiority of the Reds in Cuba was well known. The State Department knew it — it's in their "White Paper," viz:

"... It is important to understand the magnitude of the (Red) take over. Since the middle of 1960 more than 30,000 tons of Arms with an estimated value of \$50 Million have poured into Cuba. In January 1961, an eight-hour military

parade in Havana displayed Soviet JS-2 51-ton tanks, Soviet SU-100 assault guns, Soviet T-34 35-ton tanks, Soviet 76-mm field guns, Soviet 85-mm field guns, Soviet 122-mm field guns... Soviet and Czech military advisers and technicians have accompanied the flow of arms. Cubans have been sent to Czechoslovakia for training as jet pilots, ground maintenance crews and artillery men.

Cuba has the largest ground forces, 250,000 to 400,000 militia, in (Latin America) — ten times as large as Batista's former military establishment. On the basis of the lower figure, one out of every 30 Cubans is today in the armed forces as against 1 in 50 in the Soviet Union and 1 in 60 in the United States . . ."

To put an invasion force of 1200 against these heavily armed hordes borders on folly — the only rational factor (if it can be called that) — was the conviction that interior uprisings would demoralize the Castro regime; the Red police state squelched that by carefully timed wholesale arrests of 50/60,000 anti-Castro leaders.

Editor's Note: This article will be continued next week. Important highlights to be covered: (1) Yelping For Scapegoats. (2) Trudeau's Circular Hits Guerilla Plans. (3) Guerillas and Para-Military Formations: Genesis of Ideas. (4) General Taylor's Special Mission. (5) MacArthur's Intelligence System: 1941-1951.



A Letter To President Kennedy By Dr. Emilio Nunez Portuondo

Editor's Note: In last week's WEEKLY CRUSADER, Dr. Portuondo covered the following important points: (1) Cuba, Communist Satellite. (2) Interviews With John Foster Dulles. (3) Predictions That Came True. (4) Responsibility of the United States. (5) Suggestions and Concrete Proposals.

Non-intervention means tolerating the existence of a Soviet and Chinese fortress ninety miles from the coast of the U.S.A., from which this nation can be the victim of a surprise attack when so ordered by Moscow and Peking. This policy results in accepting the confiscation of property worth more than a billion dollars without any compensation at all; it also means encouraging other American republics to do the same and, if they so desire, to jail, persecute and execute U.S. citizens. Non-intervention, a policy that cannot be urged honestly, would not only result in the above conditions but would also leave the Soviet Union and Red China with all of the positive advantages.

Fourth: One of the revealing activities of the Governments of Moscow and Peking, designed to keep them in Cuba, has been the work of U.S. Communists and fellow-travelers during the last two years. Their activity has consisted in not combatting the illegal intervention of Communist Russia and Red China in Cuba, but rather in opposing all defensive action on the part of Washington, arguing that time plays against Castro and that intervention on the part of the United States would result in losing the sympathy of the American peoples.

A great power can never rely on the sympathy of all of the people in less prosperous and powerful countries. What should be strived for is mutual respect, which can only be achieved by acting honestly and refusing to tolerate the abridgement of the rules of international law which result in unjust and insolent attacks.

Fifth: We have heard the representatives of the U.S. Government, both Democrats and Republicans, say that in order to safeguard the security of this country and of the free world it was imperative to keep South Korea, Formosa and Berlin out of the dominion of the Communist powers. Thousands of young Americans offered their lives in the defense of South Korea. Millions of dollars have been spent to keep Formosa free of Communist occupation and the Seventh Fleet keeps permanent watch. The Government at Washington has announced its decision to keep Berlin free from the Communist yoke. All of this, Mr. President, with reference to lands thousands of miles away from the coast of the United States. Does it make any sense to maintain that what constitutes a great risk thousands of miles away becomes less of a risk when it occurs only ninety miles away from the U.S. shoreline?

Sixth: The United States sent troops to Lebanon, and Great Britain to Jordan, to keep those people from becoming enslaved by the Communists and their allies. How is it possible that the same measure is not adopted to save defenseless people, ninety percent of whom are non-Communist, conquered because they were turned over unarmed to the Soviet Union and Red China?

Seventh: The lack of action that has characterized the conduct of several Latin American governments in connection with the case of Cuba, is due to a lack of confidence in the leadership of the United States, a nation which, because of its military potentiality, must defend the Western Hemisphere against both Soviet and Sino-Soviet imperialism.

Nations which have observed the U.S. policy toward Cuba, which has been characterized as "patient" but which could better be termed "acquiescent," have lost confidence in the United States leadership and therefore have not reacted adequately. They are afraid that if the Castro regime proposed an understanding without substantially changing the situation prevailing in Cuba, this would be accepted. In these governments there is no uncertainty about complying with international obligations, only uncertainty about the policy which will be followed by the Government in Washington.

Eighth: Those who inform you, Mr. President, that the United States cannot solve the Cuban problem are not serving the best interests of their country nor of the free world.

The United States cannot tolerate a Communist regime situated ninety miles from its coast. Neither can the United States isolate Castro and his comrades in Cuba. The opportunity to do that has passed, when Castro had virtually no organization nor the public support of Soviet and Chinese power. With every day that passes, anti-U.S. and Communist activities will become intensified in the rest of Latin America and the governments will go Communist, some openly, others clandestinely as did Castro at the beginning of his dictatorship. The United States will become isolated, without markets and without friendly governments in this part of the world.

There is no choice in the case of Cuba. Castro and his comrades who have taken over the Island must be eradicated by force or they will destroy the United States. If more time is allowed to pass without the necessary action being taken the situation will become worse for the United States and the rest of the Americas.

Let me offer a revealing example which confirms my opinion. In the Sierra Escambray in Cuba, two thousand Cubans of all social classes and shades of political opinion, both whites and Negroes, have for several months presented the world with the Homeric spectacle of waging civil war with scant arms, munitions, food and medicine, because they will not let their fatherland become a Soviet satellite. Today, Fidel Castro is throwing against these warriors for freedom and democracy sixty thousand militiamen, armed and led by Russian and Chinese Communist technicians, with the object of annihilating them. If this takes place before an America indifferent to the Cuban tragedy, it will be but another victory for the obedient servants of international Communism.

COMPLY WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

Ninth: International instruments are in force which impose upon the United States the obligation to initiate immediate action in Cuba, to wit:

- a) The Monroe Doctrine. (1825). Here it was declared that any intention on the part of the European powers to extend their systems to any part of the Western Hemisphere would endanger the peace and security of the United States.
- b) The Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine was announced by President Grant in 1869, prohibiting the transfer of any European colony in the New World to any other power, because these transfers would affect the balance of power in detriment to the security of the United States.
- c) Article 51 of the United Nations Charter recognizes the right of legitimate defense and the same right is protected by several inter-American treaties and precedents.
- d) In 1939 the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Americas announced that they would not recognize Germany's claim to colonies in the New World, which belonged to European powers occupied by the Nazis. In July of 1940 the Congress of the United States ratified this agreement.
- e) In 1940 the same Ministers met at Havana and granted a mandate to any one or more American republics to use their own initiative in avoiding any intent of Germany to take over the European colonies. By convention they established an Inter-American Committee to administer freed territories pending the formation of governments freely chosen by the people.

Is there a jurist who believes that if these provisions were applicable for Nazi Germany, in regard to European colonies, they are not equally applicable to the Soviet Union and Red China who have taken over, not a colony, but a Republic of America?

It should be added that all of these international agreements represent not only a right but an obligation. From the moment that the United States officially

branded the Castro Government as subservient to international communism, it incurred the obligation of eradicating that regime.

- f) The Declarations of Washington of 1931, and Caracas of 1954 that I had the honor to defend as the Delegate of Cuba to the Tenth Inter-American Conference, stipulate that intervention, direct or indirect, of international Communism in any American republic shall be considered as an intent to colonize by a non-American state and consequently is a violation of sovereignty.
- g) The Rio Treaty of 1947 states that indirect or direct intervention of international Communism in any American republic constitutes a threat to the sovereignty and political independence of all of the states of the New World.
 - h) When the United States declared war on Spain in order to help Cuba achieve its independence, the Congress of the United States adopted a Joint Resolution (1898) in which it assumed the obligation of maintaining a free state in Cuba. This State has disappeared because Cuba is a satellite of the Soviet Union and Red China.

THE URGENT NEED FOR MILITARY ACTION

Mr. President, my father is one of the most revered heroes of the Cuban people. When only sixteen years of age, he threw himself into the fight against Spain for the independence of his country. General Emilio Nunez was the Chief of the Department of Expeditions of Free Cuba and he personally led expeditions from the United States that made possible the liberation of my country. It was my father who raised for the first time the flag of Cuba at the Morro Castle in Havana when the Republic was established May 20, 1902. The Apostle of our independence, Jose Marti, characterized my father as his most loyal friend and most efficient collaborator in the destruction of the Spanish power in the Island.

Consequently, I believe that I am complying with my duty as a Cuban, as a son of one of the liberators of Cuba and as an antagonist of international Communism, by calling to your attention, Mr. President, the fact that the immense majority of the Cuban people are anxious that military action be undertaken immediately, if possible by several American States jointly, and if not, by the United States unilaterally.

This action would greatly lift the spirits of the people of America. Fellow-travelers, opportunists and false neutralists of our Hemisphere will thus be convinced that it is useless to try to subvert our people and overthrow their government in order to impose Communist regimes because such regimes will receive the same treatment. For this great work of liberation you can count on the support of the Cuban people.

FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

An impartial analysis of political, ecanomic and military events in the critical areas of the warld, derived fram canfidential sources, with emphasis an facts that have not been made public. Editor: Majar General C. A. Willaughby, U.S.A. Ret. Writer. Publisher. Lecturer. Mil. Attache Am. Embassies: Venezuela, Calambia, Ecuadar 1921-1929. MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence 1939-1951. Washington Representative Christian Crusade.



CUBA: THE PACK'S IN FULL CRY-

ATTACKS ON PENTAGON AND INTELLIGENCE

Editor's Note: This timely article on the Cuban fiasco began in last week's issue. Points previously covered: Korea (1951) and Cuba (1961): They Never Learn; Aid and Comfort to the Enemy; State Department Reports on Castro's Army.

YELPING FOR "SCAPEGOATS"

The local brainwashers promptly developed all sorts of "interpretative reports." Immediate targets were promptly sorted out. Here are condensed extracts to portray the general editorial trends (our comments in italics):

- 1. President Kennedy assumes full responsibility for the role the Government had in this affair. Editor: That's generous of the President but the planning was under Eisenhower, a professional soldier who should have known that beach-heads without air-cover are doomed. He did not take that chance in the Normandy landings.
- 2. Despite pressures to strike nothing was done in the final year of the Eisenhower Administration. Editor: When American billion dollar property confiscation took place economic sanctions should have been applied at once, especially freezing of Cuban funds in New York. The Red thieves paid for Russian arms with American assets.
- 3. Initial C.I.A. support for the anti-Castro groups appears to have been designed to create a stand-by force in case the Castro regime should collapse. Editor: A sound position. A policy of reinforcements for the anti-Castro Guerillas in the mountains would have been even better. We did that habitually behind the Japanese lines.
- 4. Kennedy ordered a revaluation of the (Eisenhower?) plan. Two members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer and Admiral Arleigh Burke, encouraged the venture. Editor: Probably inaccurate. Exactly what

was planned is still not clear. But the principal scapegoats have been found.

- 5. Many top officials, at least 20 or so, were involved. There is no indication that anyone dissented—although Secretary of State Chester Bowles did express objections. Editor: Twenty officials "or so" is typical of the sloppy reporting involved. The "liberals" do rally, however, to protect their own.
- 6. Faulty intelligence largely came from the C.I.A. (1) The resistance on the beach area, from Castro's tanks and aircraft was far greater than "anyone had anticipated." (2) The hopes of a popular uprising within Cuba was not realized. Editor: It is customary when an "operation" fails (G-3) that intelligence (G-2) is blamed. The failure here is "operational (G-3). The small beach-head should have had effective air cover, for exploitation (impossible with such small numbers), defense or withdrawal. Don't send a boy to do a man's job.

A reappraisal of United States intelligence activities, especially those of a covert nature, is already scheduled. General Maxwell Taylor has been summoned to go into "guerilla and para-military formations and capacities." General Trudeau started a "ruckus" (even before the Cuban invasion) in circulating a paper prepared by an unidentified author.

TRUDEAU'S CIRCULAR HITS GUERILLA PLANS

Trudeau's anonymous paper coincided with President Kennedy's decision to build up the Army's "special forces," i.e. special units for "guerilla" actions and survival techniques in tropical jungle areas.

I know and like Trudeau. It is sometimes desirable to have a "stormy petrel" around—a sort of "His Majesty's Loyal Opposition." I am constrained, however, to point out certain flaws in his general thesis (or that of the discrete author who turned out to be an Air Force Officer—not immediately convincing as

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Approved For Release 2003/01/29: CIA-RDP80B01676R002600080001-7

qualified in "operations in jungle areas" — if anything a "ground force" specialty. My editorial comments follow Trudeau's numerical sequence in italics.

(1) "... the United States still maintains a wall of separation between politics and the military; this is fine for our domestic problems but it does not work against Communist supported guerillas.

Comment: Communist guerillas are advance forces, preliminary skirmishes for the big push. Indo-China, Laos and Tibet ultimately became conventional operations. The Red guerilla (or any Red) fights because some Red "cadre" will shoot them in the back if they retreat. We are too civilized. . . .

(2) "... Our doctrine is politically sterile and does not provide the answer to all the multiple facets of Communist cold war tactics in under-developed areas ...

Comment: Why single out cold war tactics in "under-developed areas." The degree of "under development" is no factor. It happened in "highly developed" Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. It happened in China and in Korea...

(3) "... In former colonial areas it is far better to use a well-trained and indoctrined indigenous force . . .

Comment: Not only in "former" Colonial areas — but especially in current "Colonial" areas, colonized by the Kremlin.

(4) "... a Guerilla warfare capability under U.S. sponsorship from refugees from Communist dominated countries, including not only those from the Communist bloc but also from such areas as Cuba..."

Comment: This was proposed ten years ago 82nd Congress, 1st Session January 6, 1951. Senate proposal. Pushed by Rep. C. J. Kersten M.C. as an Amendment to the Mutual Security Act. The prophets, leading us out of the wilderness, i.e. the anonymous Trudeau source—are also expert and unabashed plagiarists.

GUERILLAS AND PARA-MILITARY FORMATIONS: GENESIS OF IDEAS

- (a) The proposals are not new. The Russians set the pattern as usual, in the Spanish Civil War 1936-1939 in the formation of "International Brigades." They recruited "foreign" Communists in France, Italy, England and the United States, to fight in Spain. The American contingent became known as the "Abraham Lincoln Brigade," a superb piece of Communist semantics.
- (b) The Hon. James H. R. Cromwell, former Ambassador to Canada, proposed a "Freedom Corps" or

"Foreign Legion" recruited from refugees-expelled from behind the Iron Curtain, March 1, 1951. Several attempts have been made in Congress to establish such formations.

- (c) 82nd Congress, 1st Session, Jan. 6, 1951. S-28 introduced by Senators Lodge, Brewster, Hickenlooper, Mundt, Ives, Hendrickson and Hunt, to provide for a Volunteer Freedom Corps.
- (d) James Reston's article in the "New York Times," Dec. 9, 1951. Press reaction to proposals and Russian objections.
- (e) American Legion Endorsement. New York National Convention Aug. 25-28, 1952. Resolution No. 596.
- (f) The Hon. Charles J. Kersten M.C. Amendment to the Mutual Security Act, Section 101 (a) Public Law 165. Title 1. Section 401 M.S.A. 1954 and 1956.
- (g) The Hon. Richard B. Russell, U.S. Senator. Joint Resolution 19, Middle East. Feb. 4, 1957. Probe of the sabotage of the Kersten Amendment. Also "Staff Study" by Colonel William F. Heimlich prepared for Senator Russell.

GENERAL TAYLOR'S SPECIAL MISSION


General Taylor has been directed "to conauct a survey and review of organization and capacity of the United States in para-military planning." Pierre Salinger, the White House Press Secretary, explained suavely that para-military meant non-conventional and guerilla activities. Intelligence is an integral part . . . (the survey) may involve all agencies that play a role in para-military action. Quoting the President: "The country too long has fixed its eyes on traditional military needs . . . the Nation's security may be lost without the firing of a missile or the crossing of a border . . . We intend to re-orient our forces. We intend to intensify our efforts for a struggle in many ways more difficult than war . . ."

This has a familiar ring — but it can hardly qualify as a new frontier: it has been competently surveyed by MacArthur in the South-West Pacific Area, in the organization of the guerilla forces in the Philippines, in the security measures for the Occupation of Japan and in the Sino-Korean War 1950/51.

MacARTHURS INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM: 1941-1951

We assume that General Taylor (and Trudeau's mystery expert) will examine the MacArthur records? Every facet of modern intelligence, in war or occupation, was developed and in operation long before O.S.S. or C.I.A. appeared on the scene . . . indeed, they were neither asked for nor found necessary in MacArthur's

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Map: The Panama Canal and the Caribbean Barrier.

The Caribbean Barrier stretches in a vast semi circle, from Cuba via Hispanola to Venezuela, as a shield of protection for the Panama

In the event of war, the approaches to the Canal become the most sensitive strategic area in inter-American defense.

The Communists are aware of this: They have attempted to gain footholds in Guatemala and in British Guiana.

Both countries are within 400/600 miles of the Canal, i.e. within easy flight ranges for even obsolete bombers; in the nuclear age, this represents equally easy distances for medium-range ballistic missiles.

There are thousands of islands, coves and inlets, in the Caribbean littoral that can be used by roving submarines—and have so been used in World Wars I and II . . . unless strong, pro-American Governments prevent it.

Conversely, this indispensable pro-American Alliance must not be sacrificed to "liberal witch-hunts," to leftist attacks on Governments who are able to maintain law and order while weaker Governments have fallen prey to Communist subversion.

Headquarters. The enormous range of carefully edited reports is evident in the production statistics below. The series was distributed to all Services, in about 100 bound copies, though largely in mimeo reproduction. They are in heavy use by the faculties of our Service Schools and are beginning to show wear and tear (after ten years); they should be printed now, to be available to all students.

Vols	Title Page	Plate
	Brief History G-2 Section GHQ 219	67*
I	Guerilla Movement in the Philippines 450	65*
II	Intelligence in the Philippines 441	67*
III	Military Intelligence Section GHQ1135	244
IV	Allied Intelligence Bureau _ 835	46*
V	Allied Translator and Interpreter Section 835	46*
VI	Allied Geographic Section1123	
VII	Operations of Technical Units236	13
VIII	Counter-Intelligence Corps 518	53
IX	Civil Intelligence Section1250	252
\mathbf{X}	Civil Censorship GHQ 471	66

In his "Preface" to this series General MacArthur had this to say: "... Pursuant to a request by the War

Department, General Willoughby, who has been on my staff continuously since 1941, has produced a series of monographs dealing with the many facets of operational intelligence on the level of an overseas theater of war.

This series, developed in addition to other duties, is of monumental scope: it aggregates 11 Volumes of "Text" and 15 Volumes of "Documentary Appendices," with a total of 6004 pages and 1409 plates, maps and illustrations; it embodies wartime experience and wartime techniques that proved entirely adequate in my requirements in campaign.

As regards the "Occupation of Japan," the intelligence service proved easily applicable to changed conditions, with an appropriate shift of emphasis from "military" to "civil" intelligence.

Finally, the recent Korean war, calling for the exhaustive employment of every resource of this command under initially critical conditions, found the intelligence services swinging into action with remarkable speed and efficiency, to render the same precise and valuable services as in the campaigns of the South West Pacific area . . ."

I trust that General Taylor's "task force" now exploring new frontiers, will utilize actual performance records, in war and peace, that fall within Pierre Salinger's definition of "para-military formations." The pertinent volumes are marked (*) with an asterisk.

Editorial Note: Events, charges and counter charges in the Cuban mess move with such dizzy speed that anything written about it is likely to be out-dated. As of April 25th, President Kennedy gener-ously offered to "assume personal responsibility." However, certain additional data have come to light. We condense them without comment.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (Gen. Lemnitzer and Admiral Burke) did not approve of the Cuban landing as it was carried out. The Chiefs commented on two basic actions—a training program for Cuban refugees and a probing action, a coastal raid.

The Chiefs approved the training program and the raid, provided it was limited to a test of Castro's defenses and provided that the landing was given adequate air support.

The Central Intelligence Agency comes in for more criticism. The leaders of the Cuban Revolutionary Committee had no part in directing the actual military operation and no opportunity to co-ordinate with the Cuban underground. The C.I.A. held six leaders of the Council incommunicado while the invasion was under way. Congressional action may be expected to tighten control of the C.I.A. and limit their "operation activities" as distinct from "central collection and evaluation of intelligenve, i.e. information." My own extensions and evaluation of intelligenve, i.e. information." sive experience in the Philippines, in New Guinea, Japan and Korea (1941-1951) confirms my own recommendations, filed with C.I.A., that its basic structure should contain Deputies for Army, Air and Navy for operational co-ordination. MacArthur's staff solved this structural problem by creating a "Joint Staff Special Operations Section" (under G.H.Q.) in which all intelligence agencies, including C.I.A., were represented on an equal footing. Our operations ranged from Shanghai to Vladivostok, without practical difficulties.

Next week: LAOS AND THE PATHET LAO

The WEEKLY CRUSADER

NO PREWAR POLISH CLAIMS FOR BRESLAU OR STETTIN

POLISH GOVERNMENT IN EXILE: 1939

A London publishing house has just brought out the first volume of a comprehensive compilation of documents on Polish-Soviet relations from 1939 to 1945, compiled by a group of exile Polish scientists who had been commissioned by the "General Sikorski Historical Institute."

This collection of documents includes two items indicating that the Polish Government "in exile" had neither considered the seizure of East Pomerania with its capital Stettin nor that of Lower and Central Silesia with the capital of Breslau. Thus, the theory that these two German provinces constitute "ancient Polish territory" which Poland had to "recover" are revealed to have been a subsequent fabrication of propaganda.

The revelations of the new exile Polish publication also provide an explanation why the Polish Minister-President, Arciszewski, rejected the inclusion of Breslau and Stettin into the Polish state territory though a short time prior to the end of the war.

THE VIEWS OF WINSTON CHURCHILL

The documents prove that Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1942, in his discussions with the exile Polish Government, explicitly condemned any sort of territorial change going to be effected without plebiscites as provided by the Atlantic Charter. Consequently, the political concept of Churchill did not envisage any mass expulsions. Only in areas with a mixed population, i.e., only in Poland, population transfers might be carried through. This attitude which Churchill professed in the year 1942 also finds its expression in the Potsdam Agreement which explicitly provided for the transfer of the German population only "from Poland," that is, not from the Oder-Neisse territories; for these were only placed under Polish administration and definitely were not added to Poland.

POLISH MODIFIED CLAIMS: 1942

The extent of the Polish territorial demands, vis-avis Germany, in case of a victorious termination of the war was outlined by the exile Polish Minister-President of those days, General Sikorski, in a programmatical statement before the Polish Council of Ministers in London on January 12, 1942. The General declared that Poland wished to obtain "old Slav territories with wide access to the sea." A more detailed description of the Polish territorial demands of those days can be found in instructions given by General Sikorski to a

liaison officer to the Polish underground army in land in November 1942. According to that statement, the attainment of East Prussia, Danzig and of the Silesian area around Oppeln was being considered; in addition, the borders at the Baltic Sea were to be shifted as far as would be required for the safety of the Polish ports. No mention was made of East Pomerania with Stettin, nor of East Brandenburg and Lower and Central Silesia with Breslau.

CHURCHILL AND GENERAL SIKORSKI

Winston Churchill had pointed to the necessity of regulating territorial questions with the help of plebiscites in a conversation with General Sikorski in January 1942. He "solemnly" declared — as the Polish memorandum on this conversation puts it — "that the principles of self-determination, proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter, would be the basis of plebiscitary voting by which the population of a territory would decide on the incorporation of their land into a given state." The British Prime Minister had emphasized that only in areas in which the various populations were so interspersed that no demarcation line could be drawn the method of a transfer might be envisaged.

Moreover, Churchill stressed in this conversation that the problem of the future state borders in Europe would not be discussed in any way as long as the victory had not yet been obtained. With respect to the Polish territorial demands it also is a significant fact that the Polish conversation protocol states explicitly that in his remarks on the dividing up of Germany Churchill did not specially mention East Prussia; he had only declared that Prussia, as a state, ought to be separated from the rest of Germany.

CHURCHILL AND ATTLEE

Churchill, in Potsdam, would have come out against the Oder-Neisse line in far more stronger terms than his successor in office in those days, Prime Minister Attlee, if the British elections of that time would have brought an election victory of the Conservatives and if, consequently, he would have remained the representative of Great Britain at the Potsdam Conference.

The Polish polemics also claimed that Poland allegedly could "not exist" if the Oder-Neisse territories would return to Germany. This allegation was advanced although at the Versailles peace conference the western experts, showing strong pro-Polish inclinations, nevertheless had termed a Poland without Upper Silesia and with the eastern border at the Curzon line — i.e., approximately between the present Polish eastern border and the Versailles border in the West prior to the division of Upper Silesia — to be definitely viable. (E.P.S. Vol. X No. 13)

MAY 26, 1961

ER 61-4618/a

Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby

Dear General Willoughby:

Your letter of 2 June 1961 was most interesting. It was good of you to let me know your opinion on several matters discussed and also, to give me the program for the four articles by you that will appear in the Weekly Crusader. Stanley Grogan discussed with me your telephone conversation of yesterday and your suggestion that a thousand copies of the Weekly Crusader issues that contain the four articles might be procured and disseminated to various groups at a cost of \$150 for each thousand copies. You explained your idea also in your letter to me 2 June 1961. I am fully sware of your good intentions and of the practicality of your suggestion but I regret that CIA may not in any way participate in such a program. I am sure you understand why this must be so.

Every good wish to you and the patriotic work you are doing.

Sincerely,

STAT ODCI/SJGroga

Allen W. Dolles Director

ODCI/SJGrogan/clb (8June1961)

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